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The People Do Not Want
Étienne Tassin
“If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they 
must renounce.”
“If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the 
same, then indeed no man could be free, because 
sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-
sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very 
condition of plurality.”
Hannah Arendt 1
There exist, Hannah Arendt writes in What is Politics?, three prejudices that are opposed 
to the theoretical understanding of what politics are really about: 1. The recourse to an 
instrumental or teleological mode of thought which forces us to adopt the means-ends 
category to interpret politics, as if they were at the service of a finality external to 
themselves; 2. The assimilation of the content of politics with violence as a means to 
achieve this end; and 3. The resulting conviction that domination is the central concept of 
political theory2. Instrumentality, violence and domination constitute major 
epistemological obstacles to the intelligence of the political. But we could also wonder 
whence comes the fabrication of such a representation of politics, what is the source of 
these prejudices.
In undertaking this process, we need to acknowledge that the source of the prejudices 
that ordinarily make us conceive of politics as a coercive means of exercising domination 
resides in what I would call the belief in the will. This belief induces us into the 
unquestioned evidence that all political action proceeds of and is authorized by a will. 
Which means not only that political actions obey a will – that is, a certain type of 
intentionality that would give them their meaning and justification –, but also that the 
will is the principle of legitimacy of modern democratic politics. It would be the source 
and foundation of political actions. In short, according to this modern democratic 
orientation, it seems to go without saying that the people want, that it is of this willing 
that their sovereign power is born and, from there, the governmental power that presents 
itself as the representative of this popular sovereignty3. Thus the prejudices do not only 
1  H. Arendt, “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, New York, Penguin Books, 1992 [1977], p. 165 
(henceforth quoted BPF); The Human Condition, second edition, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1998 [1958], p. 234.
2  H. Arendt, Qu’est-ce que la politique ?, trad. Sylvie Courtine-Denamy, Paris, Seuil, 1995, p. 90.
3  The original title of this article is “Le peuple ne veut pas” – which could translate as “The people do not will.” 
For the purposes of this article however, since “willing” and “wanting” are taken to be close in their 
signification they are both used synonymously to translate “vouloir,” and are not to be confused with the 
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affect the common thought of the political, but also command the doctrine of sovereignty 
with which modern political theory has become confused.
At the source of the prejudices that make us conceive of politics as the exercise of a 
legitimate domination by the means of a coercion that is itself legitimized, we find this 
evidence that “the people want.” It is this evidence which Arendt invites us to question, 
starting with a critical examination of the notion of the will in its relation to freedom. 
Does she not suggest, indeed, and on the contrary, that “the people do not want”? And 
does she not indicate that it is at the condition of becoming attentive to the meaning of 
this non-willing that we accede to an understanding of the political freed of prejudices? 
And maybe at an understanding of the people that is itself freed from all prejudice?
I will examine this question by successively considering three things: 1. the relation: 
will, people, sovereignty. 2. The manner in which freedom must be thought against will. 3. 
The Against Rousseau of Arendt4.
I. The Source of the Prejudice: Will, People, Sovereignty.
Before questioning what it wants, what is the possible object of its will, modern 
democratic thought supposes in principle that a people is a people because of the fact that 
it is the subject of a will. Willing constitutes – willing constitutes the people into a subject, 
and into a sovereign subject. The affirmation “the people want” ties together three 
notions: will, people, sovereignty.
There is no will without a subject of this will. But there is in no way a subject without a 
will. The subject, and as for what we are concerned, the people-subject, is not simply the 
one who wills, the author and agent of its volitions; it is in reality the operation of willing 
that constitutes it as a subject. I am not someone, a subject, who moreover has this or that 
will, as if my subjectivity constituted itself independently of, and we could say previously, 
to the act of willing. I am he who wants. Willing gives me birth as a subject – the subject 
of willing. The will designates the operation which makes me the subject that I am.
We perceive immediately that there are consequently two manners to be born to 
oneself, two manners of “second births” (Arendt): the one that proceeds from the 
affirmation of the will; the other that proceeds from acting. Either voluntary affirmation 
or free action. And thus two manners of being “born”: either the subject is born from the 
will, or the actor is born (and reborn) from his action. But the subject born of willing 
cannot be assimilated with the actor born of acting. Or, in other words, the people-subject 
who wants, born of its will, cannot be confused with the people-plural who acts and is 
born of its actions.
The articulation of the people and of the will thus meets the third term: sovereignty, in 
the following manner. Who wills, and whose will is not submitted to any other, or is not 
constrained by any other, is sovereign. Who is sovereign is – that is, is a subject. The 
register of desire. (Translator’s Note)
4  Based on the idea of the Contr’Un (Against One, also known as Le Discours de la servitude volontaire) 
written by Étienne de la Boétie and published posthumously in 1574, Miguel Abensour coined the title Contre 
Hobbes (Against Hobbes) to characterise Pierre Clastre’s theoretical enterprise as aimed against Hobbes’ 
main presuppositions and theses (cf. “Le Contre-Hobbes de Pierre Clastres” in L’esprit des lois sauvages: 
Pierre Clastres ou une nouvelle anthropologie politique, Paris, Seuil, 1987, p. 115-144). (Translator’s Note)
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subjectivation produced by the will is a subjectivation on the mode of sovereignty. The 
will produces a sovereign subject or, in reality we should rather say, produces the 
sovereign as subject. And, by definition, it produces him as the subject of politics. The 
subject of politics is thus the sovereign subject. That is, the willing people.
To say inversely that “the people do not want” is to undo this triple articulation of the 
people, of the will and of sovereignty. Which means many things: to begin with, that a 
non-wanting people is not a subject: politics is not an affair of “subject”, and the people 
are not the “subject” of politics. And to follow, that it is not sovereign: politics is not an 
affair of sovereignty, and the political meaning of the people is not relative to sovereignty. 
Thus, finally, that the people could not constitute a sovereign power, by default of having 
constituted itself in the act of willing, by default of having auto-constituted itself in the 
form of a general – sovereign – will. To say that the people do not want, is thus not only to 
say that will is not its modus operandi, but also that no collective political subject could 
constitute itself under the name of the people.
Of course, the name “people” does not mean nothing either: it means something else 
than a sovereign subject: non-subject, non-sovereign people. What Arendt invites us to 
think, and what she sketches in her essay On Revolution, is a people that is neither 
subject because it is plural, nor sovereign because it is free. As soon as we reach the 
understanding that “the people do not want”, the word people comes to designate a free 
acting plurality and not a sovereign willing subject: a plurality and not a subject, a free 
and not sovereign plurality, a plurality that is free and acting and not willing. We must 
think the people, in consequence, not under the cover of a subjective entity but of an 
active plurality, not under the cover of a sovereign domination but of a freedom 
understood as power of beginning, not under the cover of an autonomous will, but of a 
conflictual interaction of the plurality.
II. Freedom versus Will.
To grasp the philosophical conditions and the political implications of the affirmation that 
“the people do not want,” we must take up the analysis of the will in its relation to 
freedom and thus to sovereignty. In “What is Freedom?” Hannah Arendt suggests a 
double genealogy of freedom: a genealogy of the political concept of freedom opposed to 
the genealogy of the philosophical concept. From there, she can demonstrate the manner 
in which the non-political concept, elaborated within the Pauline and stoic philosophical 
tradition, has imposed itself to the political domain by invalidating the originally political 
experience of freedom of Athenian democracy. The philosophical concept of freedom is 
elaborated under the theme of the will. The political concept of freedom proceeds, 
instead, from a status: the status of free man, in the space of the polis. “Freedom as 
related to politics is not a phenomenon of the will,” she writes5. It is nonetheless this 
phenomenon of the will which will in the end determine the political concept of freedom 
to the point of inflecting its meaning and to bring it back to sovereignty.
1- According to its political genealogy, freedom corresponds to the power of beginning, 
that is, of calling to existence something which did not exist previously. Spontaneity and 
5  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom? », in BPF, p. 151.
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natality come together to designate action as that by which freedom exists – “to be free 
and to act are the same” 6 – and politics as that which seeks “to establish and keep in 
existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear.” 7 The political concept of 
freedom assumes on the one hand that action is not tributary to the motives and to the 
goals by which we ordinarily determine its content (the register of intentionality), and on 
the other hand that action is ordered to the institution of a politically organised public 
space that preserves the possibility of free apparitions and guarantees the status of actors. 
By subtracting, on one side, free action from the register of intentionality, Arendt 
liberates freedom from any subordination to the will; and by referring it, on the other 
side, to the politically organised space of its apparitions, it liberates it of any pretension to 
sovereignty.
On the first side (the will), we will say that action is free precisely in the measure where 
it “is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will” 8 The 
freedom of action does not depend on the will that commands it: the will that commands 
an action “is not a matter of freedom but a question of strength or weakness” (ibid.) On 
the other side (sovereignty), if freedom is not a question of will, it is precisely that it is an 
affair of power. But power must not be thought from willing, but from capacity. Referring 
to Montesquieu – “la liberté ne peut consister qu’à pouvoir faire ce que l’on doit vouloir,” 
“freedom (…) consists in being able to do what one ought to will” 9– Arendt indicates that 
the accent is put on power, in the sense in which freedom, being political, consists “in 
being able to do” and not in being determined to do. Freedom is measured to what I can 
do and not to what I want to do.
Conjointly, we must note that the conceptual difference between freedom thought from 
willing and freedom thought from power is crossed with the difference between a 
conception of the law as the expression of general will defended by Rousseau and taken 
up by Article 6 of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789; and a 
conception of the law as the necessary relation between things (Montesquieu). Only the 
law understood in this second sense – in Montesquieu’s sense, then, and not in 
Rousseau’s – can constitute and organise politically the public space of apparitions of 
freedom.
2- According to its philosophical genealogy, freedom has, on the contrary, been thought 
as a production of the will, a subjective faculty. Taking the opposite view of the political 
experience of freedom, philosophy has designated conscience as the “appropriate region 
of human liberty” (Stuart Mill). It is to stoicism, and to Epictetus in particular, that 
Arendt traces back this genealogy of inner freedom: “no power is so absolute as that 
which man yields over himself” and “the inward space where man struggles and subdues 
himself is more entirely his own” 10 than any home in the world could be. Power is thus 
brought down to self-determination and the latter is circumscribed to the interiority of 
the conscience. “The power of the will rests on its sovereign decision to concern itself only 
6  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom? », in BPF, p. 153.
7  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom? », in BPF, p. 154.
8  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom? », in BPF, p. 152.
9  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom? », in BPF, p. 161.
10  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 148.
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with things within man’s power, and these reside exclusively in human inwardness.”  11 We 
thus find in Epictetus’ thought the themes around which will be developed with Saint Paul 
and Saint Augustine a conception of freedom as the emanation of the will: the “inner 
citadel” (Marcus Aurelius) indeed offers the image of a domination of oneself acquired at 
the price of a submission of oneself.
Division and subjection are from thereon already invested in the definition of freedom 
as sovereign will. The paradox is that this conception of freedom, anti-political insofar as 
it proceeds from a withdrawal from the world, and from an investment of the self, on one 
hand; insofar as it substitutes to the institution of plural relations outside of oneself with 
others in the public space, the instauration of a domination of oneself in the inner citadel, 
on the other hand, will end up imposing itself to the political domain as the very shape of 
all freedom.
From this genealogy which Arendt exposes in the article “What is Freedom?” and which 
she takes up in depth in the second volume of The Life of the Mind devoted to the will, I 
will essentially keep the movement which brings us from the inner domain back to the 
political field. Now, at the heart of this movement is found the inner division of the will 
with itself and the submission of the I-want to the self that it cannot dominate entirely.
The conflict of flesh and spirit which Paul presents in the Epistle to the Romans and the 
correlative powerlessness of the will devoid of power (“I see the good, I want the good, 
and I do wrong”) shows the first division between will and power, between an “I-will” and 
a “I-will-and-cannot.” This division implies two things: on one hand, that “It was the 
experience of an imperative demanding voluntary submission that led to the discovery of 
the Will” 12; on the other hand, that “the I-will inevitably is countered by an I-nill, so that 
even if the law is obeyed and fulfilled, there remains this inner resistance.” 13 It is 
remarkable that Arendt brings up both aspects and ties them to one another: voluntary 
submission, on one hand, inner resistance, on the other. Because it would suggest that 
will-power cannot be dissociated from voluntary servitude; but also from an involuntary 
insubordination, of which the flesh is one of the names.
It is however with Saint Augustine that was formulated for the first time the paradox 
inherent to the concept of will: “For the will commands that there be a will, it commands 
not something else but itself… Were the will entire, it would not even command itself to 
be, because it would already be.” 14 The will is always double: for a will to will, it must 
always will against a will that resists, be at once powerful and impotent, free and unfree, 
Arendt comments. The originality of Saint Augustine is to establish that it is not a conflict 
between two wills, or two volitions, but rather a structural disposition, might we say, of 
the will. In the very moment where it affirms itself, the will recognises its impotence 
because it finds itself split between a will that wills and a will that cannot accept that the 
will wills. The involuntary insubordination of the flesh can then be expressed as a 
resistance belonging to the will. Experienced in its impotence at the very moment of its 
affirmation, the will-power, feeling its incapacity to can what it wills, the incapacity to 
11  H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind ; vol. 2, Willing, New York, Harcourt, 1977 [1971], p. 78.
12  H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind ; vol. 2, Willing, op. cit. p. 68.
13  Ibid., p. 69.
14  Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book VIII, ix, quoted in H. Arendt, “What is Freedom?”, op. cit., p. 161.
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truly will and thus to be genuine power, transforms into “will to oppression,”15 into will-
to-power. It becomes, Arendt writes, “power-thirsty.” 16 Constantly defeated in its struggle 
with the self, the will never ceases to increase its power and conceives of freedom only as 
the exercise of a domination accomplished toward the self.
Arendt indicates three consequences of this genealogy of freedom as will-power. 1/ The 
first is that the identification of freedom with the will has led us to identify power with 
oppression or at least with the domination exercised upon us as onto others. 2/ The 
second is that the inner division of the will constitutes a form of the submission of the will 
to the self, or a form of what we could call the subjection of the I-will to the self, a 
bondage, a servitude. There we could recognize a figure of subjectivation which is built in 
the insurmountable division and conflict between me and myself, the exact opposite of 
the “two-in-one” in dialogue with myself. “I am he who wills” then means: he who 
surpasses this inner division of the self by submitting his will to resistance to his will to 
servitude. This submission is the effective content of the domination exercised on oneself. 
3/ The third is that sovereignty has become the accomplished form of freedom: “Because 
of the philosophic shift from action to will-power, from freedom as a state of being 
manifest in action to the liberum arbitrium, the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity 
(…) and became sovereignty, the ideals of a free will, independent from others and 
eventually prevailing against them.” 17
Domination, subjection, sovereignty. The content of sovereignty is this indissociable 
articulation between domination and subjection: we will note that the domination of the 
self that is never achieved nor complete and that the domination of others that has almost 
never been total, but in the totalitarian system, are the flip side of a subjection to the self, 
itself problematic because conflictual, within an ineluctably divided subject. The 
identification of freedom and sovereignty is, Arendt adds, the most pernicious and the 
most dangerous consequence because it leads either to negate freedom, no one ever being 
sovereign, or to consider that only the struggle to the death of sovereignties for 
domination can open the way toward a freedom conquered at the price of that of others. 
According to this logic, we would face the following alternative: either there cannot be any 
freedom, either it cannot be anymore. Either freedom cannot be born, either it is always 
already dead. This sovereignty-freedom is anti-political: it forbids birth and cherishes 
death. We are dealing here with something like a “transcendental illusion” of politics. This 
illusion is modern politics. And it has Rousseau for a name.
III. Arendt’s Against Rousseau.
Hannah Arendt hasn’t only written an Against Hobbes, which we can read in many pages 
dedicated to modern politics. She has also written an Against Rousseau. And her thought 
of the political is elaborated in this against. Rousseau is indeed “the most consistent 
representative of the theory of sovereignty, which he derived directly from the will, so that 
15  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 162.
16  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 163.
17  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 163.
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he could conceive of political power in the strict image of individual will-power.” 18 It is 
true that Arendt is less interested in Rousseau as such than in a Rousseau read through 
the French Revolution and singularly through Robespierre and Sieyès. Both have 
espoused the thesis of the “one and indivisible will” of the people in the form of a 
transposition of the individual will. General will and popular sovereignty make the people 
into the subject of the new conception of the political to the point of bringing the 
Jacobins, Arendt writes, to believe “in the people rather than in the republic” 19 To believe 
in the people instead of in the Republic, is to make the general will prevail on the 
constitution, Rousseau on Montesquieu, absolute authority (volonté générale, the general 
will) on public deliberation (volonté de tous, the will of all), the national principle on the 
federal principle, but also the French Revolution on the American Revolution, or the 
Jacobins on the Girondins… that is, in the end, sovereignty on freedom (or will on 
capacity). 20
Arendt’s argument can be synthesised in four steps starting from this distinction 
between the general will and the will of all, since “it appears almost as a matter of course 
that Rousseau’s volonté générale should have replaced the ancient notion of consent 
which, in Rousseau’s theory, may be found as the volonté de tous.” 21
First step. The difference between consent – will of all – and Rousseauist general will is 
of two orders. In the first order, the will of all presupposes that the body politic is 
constituted while the general will is the act of its constitution. In the other order, and 
most of all, consent supposes deliberate choices, considered opinions. Now, the will, 
Arendt writes, “essentially excludes all processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual 
agreement between them. The will, if it is to function at all, must be one and 
indivisible.” (76)
The key to the Rousseauist problematic resides in this substitution of the will to 
opinion: the will proscribes opinion just as its indivisibility proscribes plurality. A divided 
will, Rousseau writes, would be inconceivable. Popular sovereignty just as general will 
cannot be divided without being lost: the will is the negation of the plurality. And thus, 
“chaque citoyen n’opine que d’après lui,” “each citizen opinions only according to 
himself” 22. But a state, Arendt comments, “where each man thinks only his own thoughts 
is by definition a tyranny.” 23 The general will, erected into the subjective form of popular 
sovereignty, dispossesses the plurality of citizens of their singularity of actor and of 
speaker in favour of their fusion in the All-One (Tout-Un) of the People-subject. It is 
remarkable that this fusion is operated by a return to the self, not to the singular self 
through which civic actors distinguish themselves thanks to their words and to their 
18  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 163 (my italics).
19  H. Arendt, On Revolution, New York, Penguin Books, 1990 [1963], p. 75 (my italics). « People » here 
designates, not without ambiguity, the body of citizens as well as the unhappy and the unfortunate who are 
the object of the interest of an allegedly Rousseauist compassion.
20 One of the central points of the Arendtian thought of the political is found, it seems to me, in this double 
game which consists in opposing Rousseau to Hobbes and Montesquieu to Rousseau.
21  H. Arendt, On Revolution, op. cit., p. 76. Unless otherwise indicated, all the following quotations are from 
this essay.
22  Rousseau, Contrat Social, II, 3, Paris, Gallimard, « La Pléïade », p. 372. On this aspect of the arendtian 
critique, I will refer to E. Tassin, Un monde commun, Pour une cosmo-politique des conflits, Paris, Seuil, 
2003, p. 101 sq.
23  H. Arendt, « What is Freedom ? », in BPF, p. 164.
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actions, but to the general self of the citizen will. The citizen will, personal and already 
general of itself, dispenses of the exchange of opinions and of the public deliberation since 
it realises the identification of the particular individualities to the general will of the body 
politic without passing through the public manifestation of actions and of words. The 
unifying will at the principle of sovereignty proceeds to the invalidation of the plurality, 
whose principle rests in a singularisation of the actors and of the speakers within a public 
space of apparitions (actions) and of deliberations (words). 24
Second step. When Robespierre evokes “public opinion,” he refers in fact to “the 
unanimity of the general will” that procures the durable unity of the people. This unity is 
not the stability of the state or of the institutions: the reference to the general will favours 
the durable unity of the people over the stability of the political institutions. Rousseau 
took his metaphor of a general will seriously enough, Arendt writes, “to conceive of the 
nation as a body driven by one will, like an individual25, which can also change direction 
at any time without losing its identity.” The passage from “Republic” to “People” thus 
means that “the enduring unity of the future political body was guaranteed not in the 
worldly institutions which this people had in common, but in the will of the people 
themselves.” (76, my italics) In this perspective, the political problem is to insure the 
identity of a people constituted into a body politic by its general will and not to guarantee 
the durability of the institutions that allow freedom to appear. In reality, the primacy 
given to the might of the will as the constituting power of the people exposes the latter to 
the alternative of renouncing itself – “it would be absurd for the will to bind itself for the 
future” (77) – to proceed to a sort of continued creation (“I want therefore I am”).
Third step. Here Arendt finds again, without saying it explicitly, the operator of the 
division of the will that she had identified in Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. It presents 
itself in the guise of the enemy, inseparable of any process of identification. The evocation 
of the common enemy unravels two argumentative strategies. The first proceeds from the 
transposition of a logic, that of foreign affairs, into another, that of internal affairs. It is 
thus that she recalls Saint-Just’s affirmation that only foreign affairs have to do with 
politics, human relations forming, instead, the “social.” The politics internal to the 
people-body politic is then modelled on exterior politics through which this same people 
is in relation with its enemies. And so this first argumentation leads to a second one 
24 The constitution of the sovereign people by and within the general will does not proceed from a summons 
but from an integration: each individual is, as a citizen, at once himself and all the citizens. The generality is 
personal; and the personal will can thus be general. The personality – the personal character of the will or the 
identification of each person to their will – insures the subsumption of particularity under generality. Thus 
the people as a unified sovereign subject always precedes itself in the demultiplied figure of the small 
sovereigns that are the citizens, just as the latter are but the anticipation of the great sovereign subject that 
gives them their consistency. The sovereign-people-subject depends on a hyperindividualism which attempts 
to unify the multitude under the figure of the One borrowed from the individual sovereign subject: it is but 
the integrality of the small sovereignties that compose it, but their integration is only possible by the 
elimination of the words and of the actions that distinguish singularly the “actors” (the “small differences” in 
Rousseau’s language). The short-circuit that insures a direct transition between particularity and generality 
comes down to eliminating at once the distinctive singularities affirmed in speech and in action, that is, 
plurality, and the public space of their manifestation. We deduce that only a political thought of the plurality 
can stand against the subjective individualism underlying general will just as against any contract theory. 
25  “The very attraction of Rousseau’s theory for the men of the French Revolution was that he apparently had 
found a highly ingenious means to put a multitude into the place of a single person; for the general will was 
nothing more or less than what bound the many into one,” H. Arendt, On Revolution, op. cit., p. 77.
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which Rousseau will have given the example: the internalisation of the external enemy 
within the people-subject, that is, in reality, within each citizen in the guise of his 
particular will and of his egoistic interest. And this particular enemy of each citizen can be 
erected into the common internal enemy of the entire people by the generalisation that 
the general will operates: “The common enemy within the nation is the sum total of the 
particular interests of all citizens.” (78) Or still, as Rousseau writes, “L’accord de tous les 
intérêts est formé par l’opposition à celui de chacun,” “The accord of all interests is 
formed by the opposition to that of each.” (Rousseau, CS, II, 3) The result is that national 
unity is guaranteed not so much by an external enemy, after all random, than by the 
permanence of an internal enemy incarnated by the particular interest or the particular 
will of each and against who will ceaselessly struggle the general will of each citizen. This 
internal struggle in each individual of the two “wills,” or of the two aspects of the will, as 
particular will and general will, pits the citizen against the particular man and gives birth 
to the general will, making him a “true citizen of the national body politic.” (78)
Fourth step. The division internal to the subject between the citizen and the particular 
man, the general will and the particular will, has the function of producing the external 
unity of the body politic. Why? Because the division of the community in the conflicts that 
oppose citizens to one another can be surpassed and the body politic can be united only 
by the internalisation of the division in the form of a split between the particular will and 
the general will of each citizen. The external division of particular wills is surpassed by the 
internalisation of the division in the form of a conflict between the particular will and the 
general will of each citizen. This division presents two moments: it is first insubordination 
to the particular will, insubordination of the generality to particularity. “To partake in the 
body politic of the nation, each national must rise and remain in constant rebellion 
against himself,” Arendt writes (79). But this insubordination, obviously, immediately 
turns into submission of the particularity to generality. The internalisation of the division 
is at once the subjection of the particular individual to the citizen, of the particular will to 
the general will, which supposes in order to put an end to the relation of force, to the 
internal conflict, self-constraint. The obligation to obey the law is guaranteed at the auto-
submission of the subject to itself.
We obviously see that is exactly reproduced here the operation described by Saint Paul 
and taken up by Saint Augustine: conflict of the flesh and of the spirit, conflict of the will 
divided against itself. In Saint Paul’s terms, to participate to the body of Christ (to the 
Spirit), each faithful must rise up against himself and vanquish the flesh. In Saint 
Augustine’s terms, to love God, each faithful must will against his own will and submit 
himself – with, of course, all the ambiguity of this pronominal: to submit himself, that is 
to surrender his arms, but to surrender them to himself, which means submitting to God 
in himself and to be for himself like a god. In the revolutionary logic, this submission 
proceeds from the theory of terror which from Robespierre to Lenin and to Stalin, Arendt 
writes, “presupposes that the interest of the whole must automatically, and indeed 
permanently, be hostile to the particular interest of the citizen.” (79)
This submission takes the shape of selflessness as the refractory particularity necessary 
to the constitution of the self as almighty subject. This selflessness of revolutionaries must 
not be confused with heroism, Arendt points out. It is the sacrifice of the flesh in the name 
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of the Spirit, of the particularity in the name of generality. In this sacrifice, the value of a 
policy is appreciated according to the extent to which it is opposed to particular interests 
and “the value of a man may be judged by the extent to which he acts against his own 
interests and against his own will.” (79) The auto-accomplishment of the self in the figure 
of the general will proceeds from an effacement of the self as acting singularity. Nothing is 
perhaps more opposed to the revelation of the “who,” revelation of the actors, than this 
effacement of the acting singularities in the generality of a willing erected into a collective 
subject in the paradoxical mode of a sovereign servitude or of a servile sovereignty.
By way of a non-conclusion: le peuple destituant, the destituting 
people …
Whence comes, to conclude with a new beginning for the interrogation, the question of 
the people. If the figure of the sovereign people constituted by the general will is easy 
enough to grasp, so much it has been commented, what would be on the opposite a non 
willing people, a non sovereign people, a non subject people, a non constituted people, yet 
invested, since and by this evasion from any sovereign auto-constitution, of a strange 
constituting power? Or in other words, what is a people that has been destituted of its 
subject function, of its sovereign function, a people liberated from the fiction of its auto-
constitution? What is a people who is first and foremost recognizable to its destituting 
power? The people of the days of July 89, of June 48, the people of the communal 
insurrection of 1871, or maybe still of the days of October 56 in Budapest, of the Prague 
Spring, of May 68… I obviously couldn’t answer these questions here in a few minutes. 
Besides, could we ever do it? I can at least evoke the opposition which Arendt sketches, 
which puts us on track, between the peoples of the French Revolution and of the 
American Revolution.
To one side, Sieyès attempts to “put the sovereignty of the nation into the place which 
had been vacated by a sovereign king.” And so “Rousseau’s notion of a General Will, 
inspiring and directing the nation as though it were no longer composed of a multitude 
but actually formed one person (…) was indeed the theoretical substitute for the sovereign 
will of an absolute monarch.” (156, my italics) And it is also why “The ‘general will’ of 
Rousseau and Robespierre is still this divine Will which needs only to will in order to 
produce a law.” (183, my italics) Sovereign will, monarchic still, and divine: the people of 
the French Revolution is clothed with the ancient discretionary will of the Prince. The 
nation perpetuates the kingdom by becoming sovereign. The people is but a pretence of a 
people because it is nothing else than a disguised sovereign. On the opposite, to the other 
side (of the Atlantic), the word “people” for the Founding Fathers of the American 
Revolution kept its meaning of “manyness,” it evoked “the endless variety of a multitude 
whose majesty resided in its very plurality.” (93) Thus the political problem resides for 
them in the “regulation” of this plurality and not in its submission in a unified body politic 
animated by a single will. “People” then designates a plurality acting in concert, engaging 
each other mutually through promises, binding themselves through pacts without ever 
erecting themselves into a collective subject of a general will. This people do not want. 
They deliberate and act.
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The opposition of these two figures is well-known. It is also obviously insufficient. We 
would still have to describe what is done by a plural-people who do not want, who are not 
sovereign but active, who do not adhere but promise, who do not legitimate but 
elaborates, who do not command but who constitute from its fundamental resistance to 
the obligatory figures of sovereignty. In reality, this orientation would invite us to 
examine the process of the constitution of freedom once it is not thought from the 
sovereign general will of an auto-constituted collective subject. And I think that we could 
discover, against ordinary and agreed upon lessons, that constitution is not an act of the 
sovereign will or an artifice of auto-constitution. That the constituting power owes 
nothing to the will and does not requires the fiction of a people constituted in its 
sovereign will so much as the distance from itself, the destitution of itself, of a plurality 
acting at once and at the same time against the ancient regime and against the new 
regime that its action will inevitably bring forth. Maybe a meticulous analysis of the 
historical experiences of the councils could inform us on the non sovereign forms of 
organisation and of institution of which a “destituting people” is capable without 
renouncing to its own power. A constituting power of a destituting people, such would be 
the enigma of any plurality that is animated by the desire for freedom, rather than by the 
will to power.
Translated by Jérôme Melançon
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